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Tradition has it that the Belgian Revolution of 1830 began in the Brussels opera house. If future 
popular historians want to identify a memorable starting point for the 2004 Orange Revolution 
in Ukraine, they could do worse than fix on the September gala performance of Taras Bulba 
that marked the opening of the new season of opera in Kiev.
Following a lusty performance of Gogol’s tale of Zaporizhzhian Cossacks giving 17th century 
Polish occupying forces a bloody nose, bouquets were presented as the performers bowed and 
the audience enthusiastically applauded. A young woman staggered on with a bouquet in a 
basket so large it had to be placed on the stage, rather than in the hands of a soloist. A voice 
announced that the bouquet was from the Prime Minister, Viktor Fedorovich Yanukovich. The 
applause abruptly stopped, there was some booing, the performers looked awkward and 
avoided the offending bouquet.
The booing was particularly interesting in that there is no tradition of booing in Ukraine; the 
practice is a recent import from the West.
Besides being Prime Minister – parachuted in by the outgoing President Kuchma in a manner 
reminiscent of Yeltsin and Putin – Yanukovich was a candidate for the Presidential Election of 
31st October, one of a total of 24, of which (barring accident or assassination) only two had a 
realistic chance of election, himself and Viktor Andreyevich Yushchenko. Yushchenko, a 
popular former Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine and Prime Minister, latterly out of 
favour with Kuchma, was leader of the Our Ukraine bloc in parliament.
By mid-September, Kiev and other principal cities of Ukraine were saturated with Yanukovich 
posters, bearing declarations by representative doctors, nurses, teachers and others that they 
were за Януковича. Most TV stations carried much coverage of Yanukovich’s Prime 
Ministerial progress around the country, as did most of the principal newspapers. 
Announcements were made of increases to pensions and the salaries of doctors and teachers. 
The Governor of the National Bank, who was also Yanukovich’s campaign manager, imposed 
himself on university audiences for a lecture purportedly on economics that incorporated a 
clear indication of how students (and their teachers) should vote.
At that stage of the campaign, there was little or no rejoinder from Yushchenko or any of the 
other candidates. There were signs, however, of a Yanukovich backlash (by any standards his 
campaign had surely peaked too early). In particular, a bit of prison slang was being savoured 
by many tongues not old enough to know of its origin in the Gulag Archipelago. Nowadays, 
зек simply refers to a common criminal, the equivalent of the English “con” or convict. 
Yanukovich, it was widely asserted, had two convictions in his past, one for robbery, another 
for rape. “We do not want a criminal for President,” a student plainly told me.
Visiting Chernihiv one day, I noted the city was subject to the same saturation Yanukovich 
coverage as elsewhere. But something new: the Lenin memorial bore a wonderfully original 
piece of graffiti, Ленин за Януковича. What appeared to be the same hand had also scrawled 
зек over a Yanukovich poster in a shop window.
That was the first sighting of the word зек, but it soon began to appear in Kiev too, including 
on what may be the lowest budget election handout ever. Found in apartment block letter boxes 
was a three inch by one inch scrap of paper bearing an image of a leering pumpkin (for the 
Halloween election) and the legend “Голосуймо за Януковича! Голосуймо за зека!”. ( Vote 
for Yanukovich, vote for
the convict). The message was cheaply printed on paper already used on the other side and cut 
out with scissors.
Despite an almost total lack of positive coverage by the Ukrainian mass media, Yushchenko 
went into the first round election ahead in the opinion polls and had marginally more votes 
recorded against his name than any other candidate (Yushchenko 39.9%, Yanukovich 39.3%). 
However, since no candidate polled more than 50% of the vote, a second round was necessary. 
That was set for 21st November.
With the field now reduced to two candidates, Yushchenko was harder to ignore, but was still 
accorded predominantly negative attention by the mass media, and less in total than 
Yanukovich, who continued to use the office of Prime Minister as a campaign platform. 
Yushchenko had meanwhile been poisoned in an apparent attempt to kill him and was ill, 
spending time out of the country in an Austrian clinic. Nevertheless, his campaign advanced 
and the colour orange emerged as an unmissable “Small pieces of orange tape began to appear 
on trees, lamp posts, bus shelters, gradually migrating to the button holes and handbags of the 
more politically bold.” feature. Again low budget; small pieces of orange tape began to appear 
on trees, lamp posts, bus shelters – gradually migrating to the button holes and handbags of the 
more politically bold. A highly successful march was organised through Kiev and the campaign 
slogan Так, Ukrainian for Yes, appeared on hundreds of orange flags.
The outcome and aftermath of the second-round election on 21st November is now well-known 
throughout the world. Opinion polls and exit polls were confounded by the apparent result: 
victory for Yanukovich by 49 to 47%. Even before reports came in of skulduggery at Polling 
Stations, Territorial Election Commissions and the Central Election Commission, voters in 
most regions other than the south-east concluded that since they had not voted for Yanukovich 
and they hardly knew of anyone who had, the result must be untrue.
Yushchenko had called his supporters to victory rallies in Kiev’s Independence Square and 
similar locations in other cities. When it became clear that the result had been stolen, he asked 
those in Kiev to remain until victory was achieved. Temperatures plunged to -10oC and there 
was heavy snowfall, but they stayed. A tent city formed, blocking Khreshchatik, the best known 
road in Ukraine, a broad shopping street leading to Independence Square. Government offices 
were picketed.
Neither Ukraine nor Kiev were on strike, but many employers were content to see workers take 
time off to join the demonstration. A declaration of support for Yushchenko by the Mayor of 
Kiev was quickly followed by his counterpart in Lviv, and then others. Some who were slow to 
declare for Yushchenko were subjected to demonstrations outside their Town Halls. In Bila 
Tserkva it took demonstrators three days to secure the declaration they wanted. Then the 
demonstrators, many of them students, turned their attention to the Rector of the town’s 
university. He was in France and had to be hastily contacted for an affirmation that he too 
would from henceforth back Yushchenko. In Kiev, several notable public buildings were closed 
for normal use and members of their staff served hot drinks to cold and exhausted 
demonstrators, allowing them to sleep on floors. Those buildings included the National Art 
Museum and the former Музей Ленина, now reincarnated as Украинский Дом and used for 
trade fairs and exhibitions.
Much heralded counter-demonstrations by Yanukovich supporters brought to Kiev by train 
never materialised, though there is a story that some would-be demonstrators got as close as 
sidings on the outskirts of the city and remained there in subzero temperatures for a couple of 
days without food or water. Fortunately, local people concluded that they were there purely 
because they had been either “made or paid” and saw no political impediment to extending the 
usual generous Ukrainian hospitality.
At the crucial point when Yanukovich demanded forcible clearance of the Kiev demonstrators 
and Kuchma hesitated (for all his faults, which will surely be brought to our attention in the 
months and years to come, Kuchma undoubtedly averted many broken heads), the support of 
the city council was critical for the demonstrators. Kiev was effectively united against the 
Dnipropetrovsk mafia that had governed Ukraine for most of the years since independence. 
Those who deplored what some described as a putsch mostly found the discretion to keep 
silent. Many, especially politicians, administrators and businessmen who had supported 
Yanukovich on the presumption that he would win, now changed sides. The world watched 
and, but for Russia, Belarus and Moldova, generally supported.
Yushchenko and his supporters had won the moral victory, but the situation on the ground was 
essentially deadlocked. Various suggestions of new elections with new candidates were made 
while the international community attempted to broker consensus. On 3rd December, the 
Ukraine Supreme Court came to the rescue in rejecting the 21st November election as too 
seriously marred by falsification of results to be a meaningful indicator of the will of the 
people. It prescribed a 6th December re-run of the second round.
Before the necessary moves were made there was some horsetrading in parliament over 
constitutional amendments reducing the power of the President. Yushchenko agreed to place the 
weight of his voting bloc behind the changes as a quid pro quo for adjustments to the Election 
Law.
Parliament replaced the chairman and three members of the Central Election Commission 
nominated by Mr Yanukovich’s party. Polling Station and Territorial Election Commissions 
were reduced in size and now had equal numbers of members nominated by each of the two 
candidates. Those nominated by the 22 candidates excluded from the race were no longer 
admitted. Whether a Yanukovich or a Yushchenko nominee provided the chairmanship of those 
bodies was decided simply by whether it bore an odd or even number. Where the chair was 
provided by one party, the secretary was provided by the other. The use of Absentee Voter 
Certificates was greatly restricted, the discredited 21st November voter lists were dropped in 
favour of those of 31st October – subject to new amendment
and updating – and access to a mobile vote (intended for those physically unable to visit a 
Polling Station) was sharply curtailed.
By this stage, the use of government темники (from тема: topic or theme), directing what 
could and could not be said about the candidates on television and in newspapers, had been 
exposed and discontinued. Television coverage of the Yushchenko campaign mushroomed. 
Many of the poster boards around the country that had previously carried Yanukovich posters 
now carried Yushchenko posters. Yanukovich finally took a break from the office of Prime 
Minister, campaigning primarily in the east and the south, where he had greatest support. The 
Yushchenko campaign formed a “freedom train” of motor vehicles driving from city to city, 
also predominantly in the south and east. For the most part it was allowed to pass unobstructed.
A high point of the campaign was a televised debate between the two candidates, six days 
before the election. Each confronted the other with direct questions. To the neutral observer, 
Yanukovich’s performance appeared uncomfortable, but it played well with those who were 
inclined to support him anyway. It was delivered primarily in Russian and he asserted strongly 
his dedication to family and religious values. Whilst emphasising his long-standing love and 
respect for his wife, he apologised for the offence she had caused by referring to many 
Ukrainians as “goats”, in fact the least of several absurdities in her public utterances that had 
made her a laughing-stock among the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Her suggestions that the Orange 
Revolutionaries had made themselves high on drug-laced oranges and that America was 
flooding the country with US made валенки ( felt boots) were greeted with hoots of derision 
that will not completely die away for a long time. Unlike an earlier television debate, the 
broadcast was not followed by a biased
round-table discussion.
Four days before polling day, the Yushchenko campaign staged a televised concert and rally 
from “the historic stage of the Orange Revolution” in Maidan Nezalezhnosti. Besides 
Yushchenko and prominent politicians supporting him, those assembled on stage included 
Ruslana Lyzhychko, winner for Ukraine of the 2004 Eurovision Song Contest, World 
Heavyweight Boxing Champion Vitaly Klichko, and other substantial national celebrities of 
what is seen as having been an excellent year for Ukraine’s world image.
For the election, I travelled to Lviv, 40 miles from the border with Poland. Because of its 
geographical position, epitomising Ukraine (the borderland) itself, Lviv has accumulated a lot 
of history, much of it bloody, but the city is today safe and pleasant. Throughout the election 
and pre-election period, 
Lviv provided a bastion of support for Victor Yushchenko. In Lviv, as in Kiev, orange was the 
height of fashion. Clothing, scarves, accessories, little streamers of orange tape attached to 
almost everything to which they could be attached, and the fashionable hair colour for ladies 
was orange. Street traders offered Father Christmas hats for 15 Hryvna, otherwise identical hats 
in orange for 18 Hryvna.
On the day before the election, with a Danish partner, I visited ten Polling Stations in an area 
centred on Mikolaiv, 25 miles south of Lviv. Both urban and rural, the Polling Stations were 
invariably manned, Polling Commission members and the police keeping watch over the safe 
in which ballot papers had been sealed the previous day. Although democratic elections are 
rather newly rooted in Ukraine, the approach taken to sitting with the ballot papers for the 
greater part of 48 hours seemed to have been grafted on to something much older, perhaps the 
tradition of sitting with a body for a night before a funeral. People came and went, coffee was 
drunk, meals eaten. I never once caught sight of a television set, or even a radio, yet the hours 
did not appear burdensome.
In town and village alike, we were given a warm welcome, our impertinent questions about 
relationships between Yanukovich and Yushchenko nominated Commission members readily 
answered, and all urged us to call again on Election Day. In several cases we did, though we 
visited other Polling Stations too, including one inside a hospital. Our first call was at 7.30am, 
to witness final preparations and the opening of the poll. All was done much as prescribed by 
the election law, but a surprise came a few minutes before 8.00am when a priest from the 
Uniate church (Greek Orthodox-Catholic) arrived to pray, at length, for everyone and 
everything connected with the election and liberally to splash holy water over all principal 
features of the room, including ourselves.
The first of several impromptu mini-parties given in our honour came at the third Polling 
Station of the day. Dressed mostly in orange (but not the hair), there was no question where our
hostess’s allegiance lay. She proudly told us that both her sons had taken part in the 
demonstration in Kiev that brought about the re-run election. She had thought her sixteen-year-
old too young, but he “bought his train ticket and said he was going!”. She was grateful to 
someone in Kiev who took him in for a night when he got cold and hungry.
At the hospital, voter turnout was 100%; all had voted by the time of our 2.15pm visit and we 
found the Commission sitting around a long table ‘just waiting for 8.00pm’, the close of poll 
and start of the count. Again, it seemed that an age-old tradition was being drawn upon.
One particularly interesting village lived by fish farming, seasonally flooding the water 
meadows of the River Dneister. After the formalities of our visit, we were pleased to accept fish 
soup and stuffed pike as a form of high tea.
For the count, we visited a village that until three years ago was an entirely closed military 
community. A large proportion of the population remained Russian-speaking military, so the 
number of votes for Yanukovich was expected to be greater than almost anywhere else in 
Western Ukraine. The count was undertaken by the village Polling Station Commission itself, 
with great attention to the rules. Yanukovich polled 19%.
After the count, all was packaged-up with brown paper, much tape, many official stamps and 
Commission signatures and transported to the Territorial Election Commission. Arriving
at 11.00pm, we found we were by no means the first and a long wait in an anteroom lay ahead 
for our hosts (yes, they had produced vodka and a bite to eat when the counting was complete). 
As international observers, we secured a front seat where the action was.
The packages of used and unused ballots were checked, together with the arithmetic of the 
results. Unfortunate village officials who had been in too much of a hurry and got something 
wrong were sent back to try again. All members of Polling Station Commissions who did not 
travel to town with the ballots were obliged to remain at their Polling Station until word came 
that their efforts had been approved. In many cases that meant a third all-night vigil.
Most Commissions, however, had got it right first time and the result was duly announced in 
the prescribed loud voice and transmitted by computer to Kiev. Many Polling Stations in the
Lviv region recorded no more than six votes for Yanukovich, some none at all. By the time we 
got back to our hotel, Lviv was noisily celebrating its own results. Fireworks lit the sky, the 
bells of one of the several cathedrals rang out, cars with blaring horns, orange flags and 
shouting youths toured the streets.
Following the election, Victor Yanukovich filed many complaints about mostly minor 
irregularities in the conduct of the election, alleging a fixing of the vote in Yushchenko’s favour 
on much the same lines as was done for himself in November. A more substantial complaint 
was that a last-minute relaxation of the rule limiting home votes to the permanently immobile 
came too late and effectively disenfranchised thousands of elderly and temporarily unwell 
voters.
Despite the intervening New Year and Christmas holidays, the Supreme Court dealt briskly 
with all complaints and Victor Yushchenko was installed as President on 23rd January.
To adapt Mark Twain, reports of the likelihood of an east-west split of Ukraine are greatly 
exaggerated, as is speculation on a major political rift between Ukraine and Russia. Granted,
many Ukrainians see the Yushchenko victory in nationalist terms. However, pride in the 
fledgling republic, its gold and blue flag (more symbolic than most in its representation of the 
wheat and the sky of the endless steppe), its idealised Cossack heritage and Ukraine’s success 
in putting itself on the world map with sporting and the Eurovision Song Contest successes – 
and now a revolution without broken heads – is much more widespread than that.
The degree of co-operation that I witnessed between Russian-speaking mine and engineering 
factory foremen from the Donbass and their western Ukrainian election commission colleagues 
was remarkable. Friendly working relationships were the norm, and I several times heard talk 
of return visits in warmer weather for a proper holiday. When I pressed the point of 
relationships with one native of Donetsk I was told, “No problems, we are all one nation.” The 
same was happening in south-eastern Ukraine, where Yushchenko workers had been drafted in 
from the west.
The great majority hope to leave behind the corruption, theft and shame of the Soviet-style 
political domination of a Dnipropetrovsk mafia that happens to be Russian-speaking, but they 
have no thought of renouncing linguistic, family and cultural links with Russia, nor of 
peremptorily severing the economic interdependence of the two countries.
President Yushchenko visited Moscow in the week immediately following his inauguration. 
Politically, that was a good move, and Vladimir Putin made some mollifying remarks about 
future relations. Yushchenko has gone on to seek improved relations with Europe and NATO. 
Ukraine has re-acquired a significance as the borderland that it has not had since 1945, and the 
new significance is perhaps greater than ever before. 
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